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Introduction

The Falklands-Malvinas War was a brief armed conflict in 1982 between Argentina and Great Britain over the control of the Falklands Islands, also known as Islas Malvinas in Spanish, which culminated with the military victory of Britain. The battle was fought under the command of Argentina’s military dictator Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, and Great Britain’s Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Despite the British victory, the conflict over the sovereignty of the Islands itself was never completely decided, making it an unresolved conflict until the present day.

Among the vast amount of international conflicts that have occurred during the 20^th century, the Falklands-Malvinas War is a largely unknown clash that often fails to be mentioned or be taken into account when discussing how international conflicts have shaped the current relations between countries. Furthermore, the Falklands-Malvinas War was a turning point for both Argentina’s and Great Britain’s political landscape at the time, serving to establish the political regimes that would inevitably impact the way both states went on to develop in the international arena. Finally, although the War concluded with Britain’s military victory, the core issue remains unresolved and a point of discord between the countries involved, and in the general international debate regarding neocolonialism and the historical legacies of colonialism. Due to the former points, I found analyzing the Falklands War to be not only interesting but also valuable to research regarding conflict resolution in general.

Despite an extensive historical background, the War was a short-lived international armed conflict that was greatly influenced by the leaders of the involved states, the political audiences, and the concerns for national status. Similarly, its culmination saw the outcome for these leaders and political audiences, while establishing the norms that would deter both nations from reviving a conflict still considered unresolved by many. As long as Argentina and Britain do not reach an absolute resolution, there will always be an apprehensive approach to their diplomatic and economic relations, limitations to their cooperation, and the dormant threat of a clash.

As such, 40 years after the end of the armed confrontation, in a world that continues to become increasingly intertwined and experiences a variety of national and international clashes, the existence of a dormant conflict represents a risk to the integrity of the states and restricts their capabilities to establish better relations, not only with the direct opposing country, but with the respective allies of each state. Consequently, the importance of analyzing the War lies in the necessity to understand its history and context, and the subsequent impact it had on Argentina-Great Britain relations; as well as the current state of affairs and the possible ways to conclusively solve the Islands’ sovereignty conflict to better the relations of the states, which in turn could set a background for other confrontations and debates regarding neocolonialism.

Considering the historical background and factors that led to the war, along with the deterrents that kept it from being revived as an armed conflict, the working thesis of this paper is that currently, the best possible resolution to the Falklands-Malvinas issue is negotiation, facilitated through international norms and cooperation, and a progressively neutral stance on the issue from both domestic populations and governments.

Historical background

The initial discovery and claim over the Islands is often contended depending on the sources consulted, however, the first state to name the territory was Britain, although it was claimed by France shortly after, and later disputed between different colonial powers until 1970, when the British signed a Convention which gave over the rights of the Islands to Spain. With Argentina’s independence from Spain, it took formal possession of them in 1820, which was opposed by the British in 1833, when they forced the expulsion of the few Argentine settlers (Treharne, 2015, 42). This chain of events led to the start of the long and complex dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the sovereignty of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands that has lasted until the present.

Over the decades, there were some attempts by Argentina to approach the issue of the Islands’ sovereignty, most prominently during Argentina’s Peronist government when they offered to buy the Islands from the United Kingdom, but were rejected on the basis that the current inhabitants of the territory were British (Treharne, 2015, p.7).

The conflict took prominence again in the mid-60s with the United Nations General Assembly’s interest on the topic of decolonization. In 1965, it approved the Resolution 2065, urging both countries to settle the Falklands-Malvinas issue (Treharne, 2015, p.7). This led to a series of diplomatic attempts to settle the issue that were tarnished by other international problems and an extended negotiation period that simply served to increase tensions. Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa (2021) argue that the military doctrine adopted by the Argentine government exacerbated nationalist sentiments regarding the Islands and condemnation of neo-imperialism (p.8). On the other hand, David Welch (1997) remarks on the failure of negotiations for a formal transfer of sovereignty due to the Islanders, at that time already of British descent, refusal to belong to Argentina’s jurisdiction. These continuous refusals caused a prolonged series of negotiations that “merely encouraged Argentina’s hopes and expectations and confirmed its belief in the legitimacy of its claim” (p. 488).

The amalgamation of all these factors eventually led to the Falklands/Malvinas War, which started with Argentina’s incursion of the Islands on April 2nd, 1982. The armed conflict itself lasted only 74 days, with Britain’s overwhelming military victory declared on June 14^th, marking the end of the War, but not the end of the core conflict on the issue of sovereignty over the Islands.

Although several historical elements led to the war, there are other factors that played a vital role during and after the armed conflict. The War itself brought out the importance of political audiences, state leaders, and national status in the development of the armed confrontation, and further in its consequences and aftermath.

The Falklands-Malvinas War: the importance of political audiences, leaders, and national status

With the belief that the Islands were historically and rightfully theirs, the War was initiated by Argentina’s direct offensive Operation Rosario to take control over the Islands, which gave them a quick initial victory due to the surprise factor. This win was quickly overshadowed by the state’s lack of resources and fighting power. While Britain had advanced technological armament and efficient troops, Argentina had limited weapons and most soldiers were poorly trained conscripts.

Considering the costs and efforts of sending troops as far away as the South Atlantic Ocean to protect the demands of a few thousand Islanders, it could be argued that Britain’s swift military response was not anticipated by Argentina. Additionally, previous diplomatic negotiations and the United States’ initial neutral stance on the matter, made them believe negotiations would still be feasible, especially when they considered their actions as part of the pursuit for decolonization endorsed by the United Nations (Welch, 1997, p.492-494).

These factors could certainly indicate a favorable outcome for Argentina despite being the initial aggressors in the war, however, as mentioned previously, other factors at play eventually led to a full-on armed conflict. Firstly, the political leaders and domestic political audiences of both states contributed to intensifying the issue due to their own interests, morals, and ideas. 

Daniel Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack argue that “individuals play a central role in shaping international relations, including the causes of war, alliance patterns, and other areas” (2001, p. 114), they can shape and influence a state’s intentions, capabilities, and strategies. Consequently, the type of leader can become the cause a state is more likely to cause war due to their risk-taking tendencies, ideologies, or grandiose ambitions; or on the contrary, a more consistent leader is more likely to maintain alliances and avoid war.

The authors recognize in specific the relevance of Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands-Malvinas War, stating how despite various opinions advising against it from Britain’s Defense officials, the United States government, and even the public opinion, the decision to go to war was pushed by Thatcher personally (2001, p.141). Much like how Argentina hoped for negotiations, internal actors in Britain expected such an outcome, but Thatcher’s decision to pursue the war can be attributed to an attempt to gain patriotic support for her Conservative Party and maintain her power.

Thatcher’s concern over the elections and her position as the reason to engage in the war has been questioned by some scholars, but there exists enough evidence to indicate that the War was relevant to the effects of the Conservative popularity, and the domestic audiences altered their perceptions of the prime minister following the victory (Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 1990, p.80).

            In Argentina’s case, the authoritarian regime imposed by the military dictator Leopoldo Fortunato allowed him, as an individual, to have great power, which in turn meant greater influence over the state’s actions (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.140). This was especially relevant because, by 1982, Argentina was already facing deep social and economic unrest that weakened Fortunato’s leadership and produced concern for maintaining power and strengthening Argentine nationalism. Aiming for stronger support to the military government, the dictator used people’s nationalism toward the Islands and opposition to neo-imperialism to strengthen the decision to invade and claim the territory. The daring act to confront a major power in the international arena helped Fortunato obtain some of the support he had lost, but the yet unknown outcome of the War also presented a major risk for him and his regime.

 This last point connects to the second factor that can be attributed to the eventual start of the War. Both Thatcher and Fortunato were concerned with personal interests of power and made choices that led to the conflict, yet these choices were greatly influenced by the domestic political audiences of their states (Fearon, 1994, p. 579).

James D. Fearon (1994) analyses international crises under the idea of how audience costs enable states to act in front of their opponent. It states that domestic political audience costs, referring to a state’s citizens, influence how a state decides to engage in war and abandon other resolutions such as negotiation.  The main idea is that “the state more sensitive to audience costs is always less likely to back down in disputes that become public contests” (p.557).

 When applying this notion to the Falklands-Malvinas War, it is apparent that for Argentina and Fortunato, the domestic cost for escalating and then backing down was higher. The Argentine government was leading a military campaign in the Islands on the basis of nationalistic sentiments and support for decolonization; their reasoning was sensible for the majority of the public, who supported the incursion while also remaining mostly unaware of the developments of the war and the consistent losses the military was experiencing.

Fortunato’s regime could not allow the public to know the real situation of the war, nor could it back down after being the first offender, as it would prove costly for the dictator because it gave “domestic political opponents an opportunity to undermine the leader domestically and internationally” (p.581). As mentioned previously, Argentina’s economic and social situation was dire and had already created many opponents to the military dictatorship who were waiting for any weakness to bring down the regime. Backing down from the War would provide that exact weakness. Additionally, for Fortunato as a dictator, the price of losing would be greater than for Thatcher as an elected leader (p.582), because a defeat would not only mean the loss of the Islands, but the loss of his power and regime, as well as the possibility of being held accountable for his crimes as a dictator later on. All these factors represented some of the limitations from Argentina’s side to back down from the conflict and seek a resolution through other means.

In the case of Britain, the role of domestic political audiences was important due to Thatcher’s interest in establishing herself and her Conservative party as stated before. The main difference when compared with Argentina is that, although British public opinion was not in favor of war, the eventual audience costs of not responding to a direct attack from what they considered a weaker state, would be higher. It is “Thatcher’s handling of the war that altered the public judgments about her competence as prime minister” (Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 1990, p.80). Therefore, although for the Argentine audience, costs seemed to be more immediate, for Great Britain those costs would have been more likely to present themselves later.

Another important element to factor into the conflict is the argument that beyond audience costs and looking for support for the Conservative Party, Britain’s decision to go to war “was essentially based on status and prestige considerations” (Grandpierron, 2017, p.131). At that time, Great Britain had passed through a series of military and diplomatic humiliations, and the state was going through general military and economic difficulties. The Falklands invasion and the government’s inability to prevent it or even anticipate it meant just another humiliation.

In an effort to reinforce the great power status, the British, mostly led by Thatcher, decided to engage in war and justify it by declaring they were “defending the right of people to self-determination” (p.146) concerning the Islanders who refused Argentina’s claim, and “protecting democracy from dictatorship” (p.146) in the context of the Cold War and communist expansion.

This motivation does not take away from the role of the leaders or audience costs in the conflict. Thatcher and her government engaged in war because they had interests, whether personal or national. Similarly, if the motivation was prestige and status, the domestic costs for Britain would still exist and be even higher. In this way, Great Britain also had a variety of factors that limited its decision to back down from the conflict or look for a peaceful resolution.

The outcomes of the War and the deterrents to an unresolved conflict

The Falklands-Malvinas War culminated with 649 casualties from Argentina and 255 from Britain. Many more were injured, especially from Argentina’s side, but overall the conflict ended swiftly from the military standpoint. The Islands were determined to remain as British Overseas Territories under the protection of British Forces, despite claims of the contrary by some Argentine groups that continue to present-day.

With the overwhelming victory of the British, Argentina’s already heavily criticized government was discredited, and shortly after the regime itself called for elections in a move to transition to democracy. Although it could be argued that the military regime could have fought to maintain power for longer, there were already several factors that helped the fast surrender and transition to democracy. During the war, the government consistently manipulated information about the developments of the conflict by suppressing the press and soldiers; and lying to the Argentine people to the point that the loss came as a great shock for the nation and exposed once again the failings of the military government in a way that contributed to Fortunato’s speedy surrender (Tulchin, 1987, p.132, 136).

Circling back to the importance of domestic audience costs, it is clear how Argentina’s defeat and surrender had high audience costs, and the domestic opponents gained leverage on the dictatorship regime. In this way, although the fear of domestic political audiences inhibited Argentina from initially backing down from the conflict, the eventual loss of it led to the same, if not higher costs.

For Fortunato as an individual and the leader of the regime, the price of losing was, as stated before, greater. He lost his position and his government was essentially dismantled almost immediately after the war, leaving him susceptible to attacks from opponents, as well as retribution for the crimes committed during his rule.

Regarding Great Britain, the audience costs were minimal because it came out victorious from the conflict, although there was initial opposition to engage in war from the citizens, and there were general war costs for the government, the state obtained support. Thatcher, in particular, gained backing for her rule and reinforced her Conservative Party.

In regards to the concern of national status and prestige, Britain’s absolute victory did help strengthen Thatcher’s government, domestically and internationally, amongst its allies. Her claims to fight for freedom and against a dictatorship that she compared to Hitler’s (Grandpierron, 2017, p. 148), gave her approval and support from her allies and states that were already more associated with the U.S.A. and Western flank during the Cold War.

However, it had the opposite effect on the Global South, which generally supported Argentina’s cause, especially when denouncing British actions as part of neo-colonialism. Nonetheless, Tulchin Joseph (1987, p.137) argues that Argentina’s poor record on human rights, and the nature of the military regime, made some countries reluctant to fully support the country. For Latin America in particular, the war and the support from the U.S.A. to Britain exposed that cooperation with the United States was conditioned to its convenience only.

These sentiments are still present in today’s relationship between various Latin American states and the U.S.A., only exacerbated by other American interventions in Latin American governments during the last decades before the 21^st Century. Nonetheless, current socioeconomic interconnectedness between countries through new international organizations and norms has helped soften the disputes between states.

Similarly, although the Falklands-Malvinas War ended, the dispute over the sovereignty of the Islands continues until today, and therefore, it represents a dormant threat to both countries in the case of an armed conflict revival. Still, as mentioned previously, the new norms and international organizations serve as a deterrent to changing the status of the conflict to war.

Christopher Gelpi (1997), proposes the idea of the role of norms in crisis bargaining by pointing out the importance of normative standards in conflicts. He argues that “states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises” and dispute settlements alter subsequent crisis bargaining because they become normative referents and reputational constraints (p. 339).

Applying this notion to the Falklands-Malvinas issue, it is clear that there was a dispute settlement with the end of the war and Britain´s victory that helped set a positive precedent for resolution, but there are still subsequent crises, as both states continue to claim some type of sovereignty over the territory, making this an unresolved conflict.

Moreover, it is the role of norms and international organizations that have prevented the conflict from being revived. Gelpi (1997, p. 355) argues that formal international security organizations and cooperation remain important in security relations, which is exhibited by the renewal of the Argentina-Great Britain bilateral diplomatic and economic relations, as well as their participation and cooperation in diverse international organizations.

Perhaps the most important example of this cooperation in the international arena is the presence of both states in the United Nations, and their willingness to be part of the UN meetings on the subject of the Islands, as well as their acceptance of UN efforts to facilitate diplomatic exchanges on the issue.

Considering the former notions and examples, it is evident how previous normative referents and the current cooperation and relationship between both countries act as a deterrent to reviving the conflict, and furthermore, strengthen their relationships to establish an environment where negotiations can be resumed in order to resolve the conflict on a complete manner.

Although these diplomatic exchanges have not resulted in the resolution of the conflict overall, Argentina and Britain both maintain a much smoother approach to the issue and display openness to resolve the conflict through negotiations, as stated by the then President of Argentina Christina Kirchner. There are still some points of dispute, such as Argentina’s claim of British militarization of the South Atlantic, and Britain’s denial of such while demanding negotiations to be done only with the willingness of the Islanders (Willets, 2013). 

In regards to normative referents, Gilpe (1997, p.355) states that they play a role in conflict resolution, as they can alter how international behavior is interpreted and can create a reputation of trustworthiness that leads to better cooperation even between states that would not do so easily. In the case of Argentina and Britain, the biggest examples of these referents are the Madrid Agreements of 1989 and 1990 between both countries, in which the cease of hostilities was declared and diplomatic relations and military commitments were established again.

Although these agreements were never ratified as treaties, they created a base for the improvement of diplomatic relations and future peace agreements and negotiations. Additionally, in a way, they created the reputation of trustworthiness mentioned before. Both states were willing to engage in talks about the conflict, and displayed a positive attitude toward resolution and overall cooperation that would inevitably improve their relations and make future negotiations more promising.

Negotiations as the path to resolution

After analyzing the deterrents of a revived war, it is necessary to examine what that means for the resolution of this conflict in the future. First, to paint the picture of Argentina-Great Britain relations following the War, it is interesting to note that shortly after the end of the armed conflict and the transition to democracy in Argentina, the new government set to bring the issue back to the United Nations’s attention and even attempted to renew bilateral negotiations. Tulchin (1987, p. 138) argued that by that moment it was still too soon for Britain to consider negotiations, although they were very aware of the difficulties of maintaining a territory so remote from the mainland. Additionally, he supposed that Argentina’s willingness to admit its mistakes during the war and the existence of democracy itself might help the process of negotiation in the future.Mira and Pedrosa (2021, p. 24-26) add to this timeline by seconding the notion that bringing up the Falklands-Malvinas issue so soon after the war was not adequate, and there were other moments in Argentina’s government that would have led to better results, such as the 90s or early 2000s. They note, however, that every new presidency was unable to avoid the same mistakes as their predecessors, by making the War a “heroic deed”, and continuously ignoring the islanders themselves throughout the whole conflict. This last point is on the opposite end of Britain’s stance, as the country made it known from the start that the islander’s rights to self-determination were of great importance to them, and as mentioned before, was one of the main justifications used to go to war.

What this signifies for Argentina is a government and public notion for whom the loss of the Islands goes beyond a political topic into a cultural issue that relies on feelings of patriotism and historical legacies against neo-colonialism. Such an idea can represent a limitation for Argentina to resume negotiations in a more rational and objective way, nonetheless, other factors support and point to negotiations as the best prospect to achieve an absolute conflict resolution.

Although for Argentina the Falklands-Malvinas issue is part of the obligatory subjects learned in early education and there’s a present link between the Islands and patriotic sentiments, the reality of the Argentine people is that they are becoming less enthusiastic about their claim to the territory, especially the younger generation. Cara Levey and Daniel Ozarow (2021) analyzed the future of conflict and its resolution, and found that “some 45% of the Argentine population have little or no interest in the Malvinas, with 18 to 29-year-olds being the most indifferent of all age groups” (p.191) and consequently a possible strategy would be to allow inter-generational public opinion to soften.

Similarly, in Britain, the Falklands-Malvinas matter is not a priority topic for the government, and the younger generation is less likely to even know about the War fought some 40 years before. In this way, the issue remains a topic of discussion for political leaders and diplomats, but as the years pass, becomes less relevant to the domestic audience. Thus, from this approach, audience costs have become almost irrelevant to the issue, and do not represent a threat to future efforts for conflict resolution.

Furthermore, although this is an issue to consider for both countries, it does not have the same importance to the leaders of the state as it did in 1982. The issue of the Islands’ sovereignty is no longer a tool for the governments or the leaders to obtain certain support, prestige, or status. It has instead become a topic of diplomatic dialogue and a problem to be solved through means other than war.

This is not to say that the issue is not relevant, on the contrary, both states would greatly benefit from finally finding a solution to the dispute. From Britain’s side, Brexit has greatly affected the country economically in a way that it would benefit from developing commercial ties with other regions, and overall improving its standing in Latin America by dropping what is considered a neocolonial outpost (Levey and Ozarow, 2021, p.192). Argentina would also benefit from finally solving a long-standing issue that affected its relations not only with Great Britain, but some of its allies, to the point that it suffered some sanctions at the moment of the war.

Nonetheless, both states must completely embrace negotiations as the most viable way to solve the conflict, and they must be willing to engage in them with an open and long-term mindset. Perhaps, the best way to engage in these negotiations is to allow external actors to play mediators and facilitate cooperation and dialogue between the two nations. A sound proposal would be the United Nations, as it has already been involved in the issue even before the War, and it can provide a somewhat neutral ground to have a dialogue. Other states can also benefit the negotiation efforts by providing political back-up to each state, or simply expertise in topics of conflict resolution.

Another fundamental element to recognize in this conflict, which is often ignored, is the role of the Islanders in negotiations, and as an essential part of the issue that must be taken into account when considering any type of mediation. It was briefly mentioned before, but the status and wishes of the people living in the Islands have been constantly ignored by Argentina in its quest to reclaim the territory, while it had become a main conditional point for Britain in order to engage with negotiations. These people can no longer be ignored when discussing conflict resolution, and both states must be willing to engage in conversations with the Islands’ population to reach an agreement.

This need becomes more apparent when most research and diplomatic talks point to eventually reaching a type of settlement in which Argentina will have an official claim over the Islands. If such an agreement comes to be, Argentina must recognize the position of the population they are responsible for. Especially when most of them continuously claim their wish to remain with Britain, as seen more recently in a 2013 referendum where 99.8% of the people voted to remain part of the European country. Furthermore, since 2008 the Islands have become “fully self-governing in terms of taxes, internal affairs and control over natural resources. It is thus (…) increasingly a question of their becoming Falkland Islanders in a way that never existed previously.” (Jones, 2022, p.83).

As such, the Falklands-Malvinas issue has progressed from a bilateral conflict between Argentina and Great Britain to a multi-actor issue. The Islanders are no longer bystanders in the conflict and ignoring them would be a violation of sovereignty from both states. However, considering that the Islands are not an autonomous state, they can only engage in dialogue outside of the traditional diplomatic sphere. Therefore, moving forward, negotiations of any kind about this issue could greatly benefit from including discussions at the unofficial level, as they can contribute to providing new perspectives and solutions (Jones, 2022, p.88).

Moreover, Peter Jones (2022, p.85) states that, if an agreement where sovereignty is transferred to Argentina while Islanders can maintain their British citizenship and remain self-governing, there must also be external guarantees of this status. This scenario once again remarks the importance of normative referents and international cooperation in conflicts, and as such, it becomes clearer that the current international system relies heavily on these elements for conflict resolution of any kind.

The Falklands-Malvinas issue is no exception. The role of norms and international cooperation have not only been essential to improve the relations between both states throughout the past decades, but will also remain crucial in negotiation efforts in the present, and further in the future when the need to preserve the agreement appears, and the achieved resolution is in need of support or protection.

Conclusion

Although the Falklands-Malvinas War itself is over, the core issue of the Islands’ sovereignty remains alive more than 200 years later. With both states still claiming sovereignty and not willing to cede, they must move beyond interacting through the current normative referents that help them maintain their diplomatic and economic relations to new strategies that will aid them in finding an absolute resolution to the conflict.

The current international scenario, bilateral relations, and normative referents between Argentina and Great Britain make the revival of a military confrontation very unlikely, therefore, also making negotiations and diplomatic efforts the best way to achieve a resolution. And above all, these negotiations must be undertaken as more than state diplomacy, and move towards including other actors, especially the Islanders who have often been forgotten in the confrontation between both nations.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that negotiations might take a long time to produce a final resolution. It is possible that not all states or actors involved will have the same level of satisfaction with its conclusion. Nonetheless, this is the most viable way to achieve a resolution that will take into consideration all actors involved.

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